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Towards Key Aspects of and 







The South African clothing industry has shed over 70 000 jobs in the last 
decade. This has given rise to huge debate about the role of the Bargaining 
Council and Minister of Labour in regulating wages and employment 
conditions. The Bargaining Council and Minister set minimum wages, 
differentiated by region, occupation and experience. However, they have not 
permitted full-scale productivity-related pay. The government has also moved to 
restrict cooperatives. The study set out to explore the attitudes of formal and 
informal clothing workers toward the wage-regulatory framework, and three 
alternatives to the current model of wage-regulation by the Bargaining Council 
and Minister:  
 
• Performance-based incentive pay 
• Home-based informal workshops 
• Worker co-operatives 
 
Both formal and informal workers generally had a very poor understanding of 
the industry’s regulatory environment and required brief explanations. Attitudes 
to the alternatives varied between the two groups. All workers were generally 
against performance-based pay because they distrusted employers whom they 
thought would cheat them. Most formal workers regarded informal work as a 
viable alternative for retrenched workers although they themselves could not 
imagine working in informal workshops. Both sets of workers were positive 
towards worker co-operatives, which appear to have the advantage of changing 
the working relationship from manager and worker to one where the workers 
are owners. All workers demonstrated overall awareness of the pressures facing 
the clothing industry, such as those caused by cheap Chinese imports. The 
evidence in this study is not sufficient to arrive at a set of conclusions regarding 
alternatives to wage-regulation by the Bargaining Council and Minister. 
Instead, the findings reveal areas of further research and create a foundation to 




The clothing industry in South Africa has suffered massive job losses over the 
past fifteen years. The regulatory framework in the industry has been described 
as structurally rigid by some employers (primarily because of the Ministerial 
‘extension’ of collective agreements reached at the National Bargaining Council 
(NBC)), some of whom have responded by relocating to low wage areas where 
conditions of employment are, in practice, more flexible.  
 
This study set out to explore the attitudes of the Cape Town clothing workers on 
the the informalisation of the industry, the system of regulation through the 
Bargaining Council and Minister of Labour, and possible alternatives to such 
regulation. Twenty-four interviews were conducted with both formal and 
informal workers gauging their attitudes toward each of the alternatives.  
 
 
Collective Bargaining in the Clothing industry 
 
The Bargaining Council is a collective bargaining platform through which 
registered unions and employer associations negotiate terms and conditions of 
employment.1 Section 28 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA (1995)) 
lays out the functions of the Bargaining Council that include but are not limited 
to making and enforcing collective agreements, preventing and resolving labour 
disputes.2 The NBC for the Clothing Manufacturing Industry was established in 
2002, replacing the pre-existing Regional Bargaining Councils that did covered 
much but not all of the country.  
 
The most critical feature of the collective bargaining system is enshrined in 
Section 32 of the LRA (1995).3 It prescribes that parties to the negotiations may 
ask the Minister of Labour, in writing, to extend a collective agreement 
concluded in the Bargaining Council to non-parties – i.e. firms that have not 
signed the agreement, may not be members of any of the employers’ 
associations participating in the Bargaining Council, and may not even be 
registered with the Bargaining Council. The request for an extension must have 
majority support among both the trade unions and the employers’ associations in 
the Bargaining Council. The Minister is obliged to extend the collective 
agreement to non-parties as long as the trade unions that are party to the original 
agreement organise a majority of all workers in the industry, and the members 
                                                
1 Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995, s 28. 
2 A negotiated written agreement on workers’ terms and conditions of employment or matter 
of mutual interest.  
3 Ibid., s 32. 
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of the employers’ associations that are party to the agreement employ a majority 
of all employees in the industry. The Minister of Labour may extend the 
agreement if the trade unions or the employers’ associations are not 
representative by these criteria, as long as they are ‘sufficiently representative’. 
When an agreement has been extended, it is illegal for any employer to offer 
employees wages, working conditions and benefits that are less favourable than 
those set out in the extended collective agreement. 
 
 
Pressures facing the industry 
 
Higher labour standards tend to make hiring unattractive, leading to 
unemployment. From 2003, SACTWU has used the NBC, and particularly Cape 
Town based employers to impose higher wages in the clothing industry. Large 
factories in South Africa, for example Seardel (owned by SACTWU), benefit 
from capital subsidies under the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) as well as tax incentives.4 High wage bills 
have nonetheless driven them to close some factories in South Africa, including 
in Cape Town, whilst opening and maintaining those in low-wage countries 
such as Lesotho. Nattrass & Seekings (2013) contend that the push for higher 
wages was part of SACTWU’s strategy under the premise that metro employers 
could afford to pay higher wages, in part due to tax incentives and subsidies. The 
strategy backfired with the loss of over 70 000 jobs.  
 
Clothing manufacturers were also squeezed by trade liberalisation. There was 
very little incentive for South African retailers to import clothing under 
apartheid due to the strict tariff barriers that protected the local clothing 
industry. Until the 1990s tariffs were on average 90 per cent, which led retailers 
to source 93 per cent of their goods from local manufacturers. The result of 
import tariffs was a boost in employment. For example, Cape Town clothing 
industry employed over 60 000 workers.  
 
The South African government reduced tariffs in the 1990s, aiming to re-engage 
with the global economic community. The initial benefit was the lowered cost of 
imported material, which was soon outweighed by the fall of imported clothing. 
South African clothing manufacturers reneged on their contracts with local 
retailers when the rand depreciated, which forced retailers to look elsewhere, 
and China provided a cost-effective alternative.  
 
When the rand strengthened after 2002, South African clothing exports fell to 
almost nothing, whilst imports rose despite a tariff level of 40 per cent, which 
                                                
4 Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Employment Tax Incentive Bill, 2013. 
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was then raised to 45 per cent. Clothing imports from China flooded the South 
African market and comprised 61 per cent of total clothing imports by 2008 and 
74 per cent by 2010 (Nattrass & Seekings, 2013). The liberal policies did not 
only leave the domestic/national clothing industry vulnerable to Chinese 
imports, but also crippled the industry to the extent that it could not compete 
with imports from neighbouring Lesotho that experienced a twenty-fold increase 
in exports to South Africa between 2006 and 2010. Skinner & Valodia (2002) 
refer to tariff levels failing to portray a complete picture of the levels of import 
competition, especially in light of illegal imports that enter South Africa because 
of lax customs controls. It is however, important to note that the competitiveness 
of South African manufacturers relative to imports is affected by both tariffs as 
well as exchange rates.  
 
 
Profile of Respondents and Overview of 
Research Methods 
 
Twenty-five formal and informal workers in Cape Town were selected for in-
depth interviews. Ten formal workers and 14 informal workers were interviewed 
between July 2013 and March 2014; one respondent withdrew. The respondents 
were chosen regardless of age and race. They had worked in the industry for at 
least one year. The informal workers had all formerly worked in formal firms. 
The research is exploratory in nature, which made snowballing appropriate for 
sampling informal workers because they are ordinarily difficult to locate 
because no database of informal workshops exists. Formal workers were easier 
to find through the Bargaining Council list of registered firms and calls were 
placed to factory owners to obtain permission prior to conducting interviews 
with workers at the factory premises during their lunch breaks.  
 
The research did not seek to interview a representative sample or to produce 
results that could be generalised across all workers. Instead, I sought to explore 
the attitudes of workers towards the current system of collective bargaining. The 
research was more focussed on formulating precise questions that may be 










Table 1: Profile of respondents – formal workers 
 
Age Gender Occupation Years in industry 
Date of 
interview 
 46 Female  Quality controller 20 28/01/2014 
36 Female  Sorter 14 12/12/2013 
53 Female  Ironer 25 11/12/2013 
N/A Female  N/A 5 29/01/2014 
34 Female  Dispatch packer 15 13/02/2014 
N/A Female  Time study 17 17/02/2014 
N/A Male Cutter 6 03/02/2014 
N/A Male Machine mechanic 13 09/12/2013 
37 Male Machinist 
6 in South 
Africa. 11 in 
Malawi 
18/02/2014 
N/A Male Machinist  5 30/01/2014 













Table 2: Profile of respondents – informal workers 
 




35 Female Machinist 10 1 
47 Female N/A 35 2 
59 Female Machinist 32 12 
53 Female Machinist 20+ N/A 
56 Female Machinist 39 18 
50 Female Machinist 30 N/A 
53 Female Machinist 30 6 months 
42 Female Machinist 15 5 
50 Female Sample machinist 17 N/A 
58 Female Ironer 14 6 
54 Female Machinist 20 N/A 
35 Female Ironer 1.5 N/A 
33 Female Machinist 8 5 
N/A Female Machinist N/A N/A 
 
 
Understanding the regulatory framework  
 
The 24 workers interviewed were aware of the existence or had heard of 
SACTWU prior to the interview, which they referred to as “the office in Salt 
River” (i.e. the neighbourhood where SACTWU’s offices are located). The 
union shares the same building with the Bargaining Council, which may account 
for the seeming confusion regarding the purpose and functions of the two 
bodies. 
  
Table 3: Understanding of the regulatory framework 
 
Level No knowledge Poor knowledge Good understanding 
Formal 6 2 2 
Informal 11 3 0 
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A shocking revelation was a remarkably poor understanding of the functions of 
the Bargaining Council and the union by both worker groups. The union and the 
Bargaining Council deduct levies from wages, so it is not farfetched to expect 
workers to have good knowledge of the two bodies that in addition to ensuring 
they have less take-home pay, provides employee benefits. It boggles the mind 
what the union talks about when the officials visit factories because members 
understand very little about its purpose in the industry. Apathy was the general 
attitude held by workers towards the union and the Bargaining Council – leading 
them to be removed from union activities. Many of the workers recounted how 
they do not attend union meetings. Formally employed workers felt that the 
union was too aligned with the employers:  
 
‘There is a lot of good workers here but they don’t want to talk, you 
know why? Because every time the union people come here, they go 
to the bosses. They don’t confront us with how we feel, how is the 
work, is your moneys right?’. 
 
The workers have serious distrust of SACTWU and are not convinced the union 
is representing them well. Workers further lamented how union meetings are 
typically held during their 30-minute lunch break, which may contribute to why 
they did not attend meetings, leading to greater ignorance of union activities. 
 
Workers in informal workshops blamed the union for retrenchments. The 
workers felt that the union was staffed with self-interested individuals who were 
content with only receiving salaries deducted from their wages. One formal 
worker articulated this attitude better:  
 
‘I don’t think they have my best interests at heart man, because if they 
get their full salary at the end of the month, they are happy, but what 
about us? Because from my point of view, we are working for their 
salaries, you see what I mean, it’s the truth my bru’.  
 
The general attitude among workers was that given a chance to return to formal 
employment, they would pass on the offer because they feared they would be 
exploited and the union would not assist them. Retrenched workers felt hard 
done by the union as well as the Bargaining Council that they felt could not 
protect them before and after retrenchment as many of them did not receive their 
provident funds. SACTWU, as the only worker party at the Bargaining Council, 
should have helped the workers to receive their provident fund, even if the union 





Alternatives to the current system of collective 
bargaining and wage model 
 
The current system of collective bargaining and flat wage rate has not worked as 
well as anticipated with the introduction of the NBC in 2002. SACTWU is too 
proud to accept this, and has made half-hearted attempts at resolving the crisis in 
the industry. The union has further demonstrated its desperation by representing 
slower job destruction as ‘recovery’. Employers have for years advocated 
performance-related pay. The growing informal sector suggests a new system 
that includes informal workshops under the ambit of the Bargaining Council. 
The Cooperatives Act (2005) suggests a third way of dealing with the job loss 
crisis facing the industry. Respondents in this study also offered a wage model 





Alex Liu, Chairman of the Newcastle Chinese Chamber of Commerce, pointed 
out in an interview with Planting (2011) that, “our fight is not about paying low 
wages”. 5 Liu’s comment represents the South African clothing manufacturers’ 
argument for demanding performance-related pay since inception of the NBC in 
2002. The manufacturers argue that any new wage model should reflect 
productivity in order to ensure their competitiveness6  in part due to wages 
becoming directly proportional to productivity. The 2012-13 Collective 
Agreement despite its failure heralded the dawn of a very modest performance-
based supplement to the set wage. There was a single respondent interviewed for 
this study who attested to having worked under a performance-related wage 
model, which confirms that there are some employers in Cape Town who are 
experimenting (illegally) with this wage model.  
 
For the performance-based pay to work well, it requires trust and confidence on 
the part of the workers that their interests are protected faithfully and 
consistently (Billikopf, 2004). Both sets of workers who participated in the 
study referred to their respective employers as skelm, an Afrikaans term for 
‘crook’, which speaks to the nature of the relationship that exists between 
workers and manufacturers. There is massive distrust of management generally, 
and even more so over faithful implementation of performance-related pay. 
Workers felt they could not trust employers to implement this alternative pay 
                                                
5 Sasha Planting, The dirty truth about SA’s clothing Bargaining Council, Available from: 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/archive/the-dirty-truth-about-sas-clothing-bargaining-coun/   
6 Competitiveness in this paper means a factory’s capacity to produce output comparable or 
better than other factories, at a cost that allows it to continuously remain in business.  
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model fairly for example, they feared that employers would renege on agreed 
pay should the workers meet the set production targets. Such distrust is 
understandable because some workers have been cheated by previous employers 
who have closed factories without notice, and without paying their wages for the 
month,  
 
‘At XXX, we worked the whole night through and he closed up the 
next day and he disappeared…we have heard nothing from him and he 
didn’t pay us….’. 
 
This worker alleged that neither the union nor the Bargaining Council had 
assisted the affected workers. The failure of the union to represent workers’ 
interests and allegations of aligning with employers also meant that workers 
lacked confidence in the targets that would be set by the employers under the 
performance-related wage model.  
 
Generally, workers were against incentive pay because they felt the system was 
innately designed to ensure they take less money home every week. Although 
workers are looking for an alternative to the current wage model, they still 
preferred to work under the current wage model because it was more predictable 
than the employer-suggested alternative. Workers were anxious that they would 
not be able to make enough money to maintain a sustainable livelihood during 
the low season, when production was low.  
 
‘I don’t like it because what about the days I don’t produce, say if I 
work on a new style, so for 4-5 days a week I don’t produce my 
normal, what happens then? What am I gonna earn for the week? 
Rather leave it like that…’.  
 
Other factors such as delays in the delivery of buttons or other materials would 
adversely affect their weekly wages because it negatively affects order turn 
around time. In such circumstances, workers are at a disadvantage because they 
are vulnerable to these external factors over which they have no control. Such 
delays that are beyond workers’ control provide a big loophole that needs to be 
plugged before full-scale introduction of the performance-based wage model. 
 
Informal workers preferred the relaxed environment they were working under at 
the home-based informal workshops, and productivity-based wage model would 
change this set-up, thus demanding that they work harder under more pressure:  
 
‘[The] system would not work in CMT … for my age it wouldn’t 
work but maybe for a younger person can have energy … it is not a 
fair way of paying people…’. 
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 It is also difficult to see how this system would work at a home-based workshop 
where workers come to work irregularly as per order requirements.  
 
Workers unanimously agreed that there was a role for the union should the 
unpopular performance-based wage model be introduced in the clothing 
industry. It is a bit shocking that workers found the need to include the union in 
any new system of collective bargaining given their distrust of SACWTU. 
Nevertheless, it appears distrust of employers outweighs the negative attitudes 
workers have toward the union. Workers also felt that the union as the 
‘custodian’ of workers’ rights had a critical role in the industry:  
 
‘I know the union because when I leave here I will have nothing, I 
will have nothing, only my weekly wages’.  
 
These are sentiments of an informal worker who understood union functions and 
the benefits that came with working in a unionised, Bargaining Council 
regulated environment.  
 
Manufacturers have suggested, that after implementing the performance-related 
pay model, SACTWU would only negotiate the base wage, whilst workers 
assume responsibility for their wages through the incentivised portion. Rogerson 
(2010) identified low productivity as the biggest weakness of the South African 
clothing industry. The implication is that some of the pressure faced by the 
industry is a result of a mismatch between production costs and revenue 
generated. Retrenched workers acknowledged that performance-based pay could 
have saved their formal jobs because employers would have been paying for 
actual labour hours/work completed, thus not compensating wasted hours:  
 
‘I think the system would have saved my job because I would go 
home with less money every week. I have a family to feed…’. 
 
 The wage model also has the potential to solve the challenges facing employers 
of paying non-performing workers, which in addition to putting downward 
pressure on costs would also discontent exceptional workers. 
 
Findings by Billikopf (2004) point to the possible effectiveness of a new 
performance-based pay model in South Africa that motivates individual workers 
whilst increasing productivity. In this study, there was a correlation between 
workers who regarded themselves efficient and hardworking, and an acceptance 
of performance-based pay. The most significant contribution came from a 




‘I worked under that system in Malawi … ten people can produce 
production done by twenty people and so the Chinese would tell the 
supervisor to bring the top machinists and then measure everyone else 
and come up with a grading scale according to how many operations 
you could do and if you can reach your targets, so we were paid a 
different wage although we were all machinists…but when I come 
here the bosses follow what the union says and we get the same 
amount … I complain though because my type is hard to find and I 
get paid the same as someone who put a label on a shirt because they 
are called a machinist…the bosses should make grades to know who 
is performing and give them more money…I hit my targets every day 
and some people are playing, but we get the same’. 
 
The ‘efficient’ workers felt it was a fair way of receiving wages, and would 
motivate everyone to work extra hard in order to receive a higher wage. The 
performance-based pay model has more merit than the union backed and failed 
2011-wage agreement that was hailed as a hallmark and saw new job entrants 
receiving lower wages even when they were more talented and more efficient 
than existing workers. Nevertheless, buy-in from the workers is necessary if any 
alternative model is going to work and improve conditions in the industry, and 
since they grossly distrust management, it is unlikely they would agree to 
implementation of the performance-based wage model. 
 
 
Unregulated home-based workshops as an 
alternative to formal work 
 
In the South African clothing industry, an operation is regarded as 
informal/unregulated if it employs more than six people, and is not registered 
with the NBC. Failure to comply with collective agreements by workshops 
employing more than six people makes them illegal (Vincentio, 2008: 11). 
Nevertheless, an employment relationship still exists between workshop owners 
and workers, outside the ambit of the Bargaining Council and trade union.  
 
Former colleagues usually own the informal workshops, which removes the 
hierarchies typical of the formal factory, and as such offers a less stressful 
environment for the workers:  
 
‘I would never go back to factory because from the time I have been 
working here, I feel like working’.  
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The profile of informal respondents shows they are generally advanced in age 
and cannot maintain the fast pace demanded in the formal factory. The workers 
also enjoyed undertaking multiple operations such as making an entire dress, 
whereas they could only make part of a dress in the formal factory. 
 
Informal workers could articulate advantages and demerits of informal 
workshops better than formal workers however; they remained on the fence 
regarding which option they preferred. Informal workshops are typically home-
based, thus cut transport costs – ensuring workers have a comparable take-home 
pay to formal workers who encounter many wage deductions. Machinists in 
informal workshops mentioned that they were receiving approximately R750 per 
week in wages and the formally employed machinists reported that they were 
receiving approximately R880 per week before the deductions and transport 
costs. The 2012/2013 collective agreement stipulated that a qualified machinist 
should receive R784 in a metro area like Cape Town. In the light of these wages 
reported by the two worker groups, informal workers seem to have a better 
arrangement than formally employed workers. 
 
The major drawback of informal workshops for formal workers was its inherent 
unpredictability, especially availability of orders, which meant workers would 
not be in control of when and how long they work – adversely affecting take-
home pay. It is not surprising that this set of workers was vehemently against 
performance-related pay due to its unpredictability as well as distrust of 
management. Despite citing informal work as a good way to earn money, formal 
workers could not see clear advantages of migrating to this sector:  
 
‘Not really, I would not consider doing homework, I would rather find 
some other type of work’.  
 
Status and prestige informed attitudes because formal workers thought informal 
workshops were beneath them and typically a spontaneous reaction to 
retrenchment for most workers. Further, formal workers’ attitudes were so 
negative that the majority would look for work outside the clothing factory 
should they be retrenched.  
 
Non-compliance with the Bargaining Council agreements usually means poor 
working conditions and job insecurity (Godfrey et al., 2005: 13). Formal 
workers interviewed in this study echoed these sentiments and although having 
had very negative attitudes toward the union, lamented the lack of regulations in 
the informal workshops, which would lead to exploitation and unfair labour 
practices that would go unchecked should the union not be involved. A recurring 
theme is lack of trust for management both in the formal and informal held by 
the formal workers.  
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Informal workers similar to formal workers, maintained they would want union 
representation in any alternative – adding to the seemingly contradictory 
attitudes. These workers have a yearning for a better life that is protected by the 
union and the legislative framework at large:  
 
‘There is stuff that you want from the union and they are prepared to 
give it to you … sick book, pension you can withdraw when you get 
retired, many things you will never get now…’. 
 
 Several informal workers, although having been retrenched without receiving 
help and support from the union, appreciated the ‘illusive’ protection and other 
social benefits they should have received whilst working in the formal factory. 
Their hope is SACTWU would start representing them, as it should have done 
during their formal factory days. A dichotomy of views emerged amongst the 
informal workers themselves that was difficult to resolve but pointed to the 
inherent malleability of attitudes that may lead to incoherent and often 
contradictory attitudes towards an object of the attitude, which may also change 
when the circumstances change. 
 
There were a few home-based workshops that were registered with the 
Bargaining Council and deducted money for inter alia the sick fund, whilst 
issuing sick books that the employees could use at designated clinics. Workers 
at these factories nevertheless felt that the deductions were not fair and wanted 
their full wage because they did not trust the employer to consistently pay the 
Bargaining Council, in turn, they would not receive their provident fund should 
they get retrenched or retire.  
 
There were several factories, both registered and unregistered with the 
Bargaining Council that were subcontracted to do work for larger firms. Upon 
further inquiry it was found that larger clothing factories opened up smaller 
factories or outsourced to smaller factories where they would pay less in 
salaries. Such moves from Cape Town based manufacturers meant they were 
inadvertently noncompliant with collective agreements that they were party to 
and have been mischievous in pushing for higher wages that non-metro 
employers cannot pay. Godfrey et al. (2005: 33) commented that the 
commercial contract was the key mechanism that enabled these formal factories 
to effectively employ these smaller workshops without fulfilling the obligations 
of employers in terms of the labour regulations. As the only worker party on the 
Bargaining Council, the union is obliged to act against unscrupulous employers 
cheating its members, and findings from this research suggest that SACTWU is 




Worker Cooperatives: a worthy alternative? 
 
There are five basic types of co-operatives, namely consumer/supplier co-
operatives, savings and credit co-operatives, marketing/producer co-operatives, 
service co-operatives and, lastly, worker co-operatives (Ramadiro et al., 2003: 
9). This study focuses on the worker co-operative, which is a primary co-
operative whose main aim is to provide employment to its members.7 In such an 
enterprise, workers have a higher degree of control over the internal functioning 
of the cooperative as worker-owners, however, the competitive environment 
maintains a level of influence on the cooperative (Ramadiro et al., 2003: 10).  
 
Many of the 24 workers interviewed for this study were in favour of worker co-
operatives and particularly interested in becoming worker-owners. Distrust of 
the union, Bargaining Council and employers made worker cooperatives a more 
attractive option for workers who participated in this study. There was a good 
number of workers who had amassed a sizable amount of sewing machines from 
the wages they had received over the years, with a view to open their own 
workshops. Informal workshops that are widespread in South Africa 
demonstrate a keen interest in common ownership, which makes worker co-
operatives a valuable alternative to the current system of collective bargaining. 
 
Co-operatives are worker-owned and offer the potential of a less exploitative 
work situation than one might find in an informal workshop, thereby evading the 
exploitation and job insecurity noted by Godfrey et al. (2005). The co-operative 
values and international principles have remained consistent through time, 
regardless of geographical location. The most successful known worker co-
operative is Mondragon in Spain, and its founding fathers laid down the values 
adopted by the South African Co-operatives Act of 2005. These are the values 
of self-help, self-reliance, self-responsibility, democracy, equality and social 
responsibility. 8  The workers interviewed in this study appreciated that the 
worker co-operatives would equip them with more decision-making authority 
and the working relationship would change from employee to owner. Workers 
thought co-operatives would improve their standards of living, allowing them to 
overcome some of the socio-economic challenges and vulnerability they are 
currently facing. The uniformity of attitudes shows that co-operatives appeal to 
both worker groups and are a legitimate alternative to unemployment after 
retrenchments as well as better working conditions.  
 
                                                
7 Co-operatives Act, 14 of 2005, Chapter 1 ss 30. 
8 Co-operatives Act, 14 of 2005. William Whyte and King Whyte, Making Mondragon, (New 
York: ILR Press, 1998), 273-274. 
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SACTWU has often criticised the co-operatives mainly in the KwaZulu-Natal 
region as being bogus and evading the law. The Co-operatives Act (2005) 
regulates co-operatives in South Africa and although it has been amended, it has 
not yet been promulgated.  The Act is therefore, in a state of limbo, meaning the 
asynchronous relationship that exists with labour legislation continues to 
exclude co-operatives from the ambit of the LRA (1995), because the LRA 
(1995) does not recognise co-operative members as employees. Once the 
loophole that exists in the Co-operatives Act (2005) is resolved by the 
amendments to the Act and worker co-operatives are covered by the LRA 
(1995), it is reasonable to suggest that the issue of the bogus co-operatives 
reported in the press to be prevalent in KwaZulu-Natal will be curbed. 
Nevertheless, once promulgated, the amendments will prescribe a new 
classification of a co-operative as an entity with less than 50 people, and former 
employers may artificially break up firms employing more than 50 people into 
two in order to fit the new classification of a co-operative. Prior to 
promulgation, these amendments have to be further amended in order to close 
this looming loophole. Findings from this research already revealed how larger 
factories are subcontracting or creating smaller firms in order to evade collective 
agreements on wages and working conditions. 
 
Interviewed workers felt that current factory owners had expertise to run a 
business, a skill they felt they did not possess: 
 
‘No, I would not be open to starting my own co-operative … the 
government might give you capital but if you don’t know what to do, 
you will fail … how I see it myself is if I don’t work and sweat for 
that money, I am not gonna use it properly, I will not know how to 
control that money … you can’t just give people money because they 
have not planned, they should earn their own money and have a plan 
first because they will end up buying beers…’.  
 
These perceptions discourage workers from starting their own businesses and 
may be resolved by the amendments to the Act. In addition to closing the 
loophole that will see co-operative members covered by the LRA (1995), the 
amendments have provisions to set-up support agencies such as the co-
operatives advisory council. The support agencies will assist the predominantly 
poorly educated clothing workers on running a business and acquainting them 
with knowledge of the clothing value chain. It is possible that the workers are 
intimidated by the thought of running a business, perhaps due to low levels of 
education, and establishing training programmes specifically for building basic 
business skills may overcome this fear. Such an initiative has to perform better 
than SACTWU’s broken marriage with the Fibre Processing and Manufacturing 
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Skills Education and Training Authority (FP&M SETA) where the two have 
attempted to establish training programmes however, with very limited success. 
 
The workers commented that the government should help them acquire orders 
should they start a co-operative and alluded to stopping imports from China as 
another means of creating demand in the clothing industry:  
 
‘They mustn’t make imports come. Like there’s lots of pattern makers 
and designers and so they can do their own work…’.  
 
On the one hand, this is not farfetched because strict import tariffs under the 
National Party ensured that 93 per cent of clothing was produced locally, 
thereby forcing South African retailers to purchase from local manufacturers. 
Higher tariffs nevertheless, almost always means higher prices, meaning gains 
for South African clothing workers comes at a cost of the poor consumers who 
typically buy cheap clothing. On the other hand, post-1994 South African 
government put in place temporary restrictions on Chinese clothing imports in 
2007 and 2008 with limited success because Chinese imports still rose to 61 per 
cent, whilst illegal imports also rose during this period. What this means is the 
solution to the crisis facing the clothing industry does not lie with restricting 
Chinese imports alone and needs to be tackled from multiple angles.  
 
 
Worker suggested alternatives to regulation by the 
Bargaining Council 
 
Workers demonstrated a good understanding of the pressures facing the clothing 
industry such as import tariffs; however, it was not clear how they came to know 
of these pressures - possibly through the press. Such findings are interesting 
because the majority of workers interviewed did not showcase a good 
understanding of the regulatory environment. The most significant response was 
from an informal home-based worker who suggested the following as a viable 
alternative:  
 
‘You don’t want to retrench everybody, so you can work three days 
this week, you can work two days next week. So that everybody can 
have a fair chance to have money, even if not a lot, but you get 
something’.  
 
This respondent outlined a model similar to the Training Layoff Scheme (TLS) 
piloted in 2009 and run by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA) (see Daphne & Everett, 2011). The TLS provides 
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employers in mainly financial distress an opportunity to recover by placing 
some of the workers on training programmes that will be combined with short 
time. Workers avoid retrenchment by receiving 75 per cent of their basic wage, 
whilst the employer saves on the wage bill. The National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa explored this alternative and saved 143 jobs as 
372 workers completed the training. Retrenchments, growth of informalisation 
and retirement of the ageing workforce has resulted a large skills shortage that is 
not adequately replaced and the TLS could be a suitable remedy.  
 
 
Conclusions and areas of further research 
 
The scope of the study was to explore Cape Town clothing workers’ attitudes 
towards regulation of the clothing industry by the Bargaining Council and 
possible alternatives that may mitigate further job losses and possibly create 
employment.  
 
Findings from the study showed that formal and informal Cape Town clothing 
workers have a remarkably poor understanding of the regulatory environment 
governing the industry. The workers lack a clear understanding of the function, 
purpose of SACTWU and the Bargaining Council, and distrust the two bodies. 
Nevertheless, both sets of workers also distrust employers (both formal firms 
and informal workshops owners) over performance-related pay that they cannot 
conceive of adopting an alternative system of collective bargaining and wage 
model that does not involve SACTWU. Workers have hope for the union to 
represent them adequately, hence the need to keep them in any alternative 
system. Once the Co-operatives Act (2005) is promulgated and all loopholes are 
covered, it is an alternative that is more likely to receive buy-in from both 
worker groups as they are interested in changing the working relationship from 
employee to worker-owner.  
 
The findings were not sufficient for the study to conclude definitively that any 
available alternative will help save jobs, create employment, and thus better than 
the current wage model and system of collective bargaining. Further studies are 
necessary in order to mitigate the job losses and stop the labour intensive 
industry from shrinking. Such studies would need to include all industry 
stakeholders, going further than this study that focussed only on the workers 
who had not been studied before.  
 
Key areas of further study are centred on ascertaining ways that SACTWU 
could better engage workers, which may lead to worker involvement in 
SACTWU activities and elimination of apathy. An investigation into the 
effectiveness of the TLS in the clothing industry is worthwhile as it may upskill 
 18 
current employees through training whilst saving jobs. Further studies are 
necessary to see how informal workshops may be included into the regulatory 
framework because the 70 000 jobs lost from 2003 have most likely been 
absorbed, in addition to the 60 000 informal workers recorded in 1998. Lastly, 
once promulgated, it is noteworthy to research ways of ensuring worker co-
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